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Abstract
In this article we show how Hans Kelsen jurisprudence and Intuition-
istic logic are used to avoid the well-known contrary-to-duty (CTD) para-
doxes, such as Chisholm paradoxes and its variants. This article uses an
intuitionistic version of the ALC description logic, named iALC, to show
how an ontology based on individually valid legal statements is able to
avoid CTDs by providing models to them.
1 Introduction
Prof. Luis Farin˜as del Cerro wrote a bunch of articles reporting the results
he obtained by designing logics for very interesting and specific purposes. The
elegance of the underlying ideas and the presentation form is out of discussion.
Many researchers in logic would like to have his ability to extract logic from
facts and their relationships, building new judgments. One of the authors of
this article ever tried to be able to have this resulting research. When we were
invited to contribute to prof. Luis Farin˜as del Cerro Festschrifft this become the
opportunity to report to the master maybe the only research that we conduct on
the lines of defining a logic for a specific formalization. In this article, we report
our results in the last seven years in the designing logics for legal ontologies.
Classical First Order Logic has been widely used as a basis for ontology
creation and reasoning in many domains. These domains naturally include Le-
gal Knowledge and Jurisprudence. As we expect, consistency is an important
issue for legal ontologies. However, due to their inherently normative feature,
coherence (consistency) in legal ontologies is more subtle than in other domains.
∗∗Acknowledge CNPQ, prof. David Pearce, Universidad Polite´cnica de Madrid.
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Consistency, or absence of logical contradictions, seems more difficult to main-
tain when more than one law system can judge a case, what we call a conflict of
laws. There are some legal mechanisms to solve these conflicts such as stating
privileged fori or other ruling jurisdiction. In most of the cases, the conflict is
solved by adopting a law hierarchy or precedence, rather better, ordering on
laws. Even under these precedence mechanisms, coherence is still a major issue
in legal systems. Each layer in this legal hierarchy has to be consistent. Since
consistency is a direct consequence of how one deals with the logical negation,
negation is also a main concern in legal systems. Deontic Logic, here consid-
ered as an extension of Classical Logic, has been widely used to formalize the
normative aspects of the legal knowledge. There is some disagreement on us-
ing deontic logic, and any of its variants, to this task. Since a seminal paper
by Alchourron and Martino (Alchourron & Martino, 1990), the propositional
aspect of laws has been under discussion. In (Alchourron & Martino, 1990),
the authors argue that laws are not to be considered as propositions, in full
agreement with Hans Kelsen jurisprudence. The Kelsenian approach to Legal
Ontologies considers the term “ontologies on laws” more appropriate than “law
ontology”. In previous works, we showed that Classical logic is not adequate
to cope with a Kelsenian based Legal Ontology. Because of the popularity
of Description Logic for expressing ontologies nowadays, we developed an In-
tuitionistic version of Description Logic particularly devised to express Legal
Ontologies. This logic is called iALC. In this article, we show how iALC avoids
some Contrary-to-duty paradoxes, as Chisholm paradox and other paradoxes
that appear in deontic logic, such as the good samaritan and the knower. For
these paradoxes, we provide iALC models. Finally, we discuss the main role
of the intuitionistic negation in this issue, finding out that its success may be
a consequence of its paracomplete logical aspect. This investigation opens the
use of other paracomplete logics in accomplishing a logical basis for Kelsenian
legal ontologies, as a complementary solution to those based on paraconsistent
logics, see (M.E. Coniglio, 2009).
2 A brief discussion on Kelsenian Jurisprudence
and its logic
A very important task in jurisprudence (legal theory) is to make precise the
use of the term “law”, the individuation problem, and it is one of the most
fundamental open questions in jurisprudence. It requires firstly answering the
question “What is to count as one complete law?” (Raz, 1972). There are two
main approaches to answer this question. One approach is to consider “the
law” as the result of a natural process that yields a set of norms responsible for
stating perfect social behavior. Another approach is to consider “the law” as a
set of individual legal statements, each of them created to enforce a positively
desired behavior in the society. As a consequence, in the first approach, the
norms say what are the best morally speaking accepted state of affairs in a
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particular society, while, in the second approach, each legal statement rules an
aspect of the society that the legislature wants to enforce the behavior. The first
is more related to what is called Natural Law and the last to Legal positivism.
We can say that the Legal positivism is closer to the way modeling is taken
in Computer Science. In the natural approach to the law, it is even harder
to define a system of laws than in the legal positivism. The natural approach
demands stronger knowledge of the interdependency between the underlying
legal statements than legal positivism. Because of that, the natural approach,
in essence, is harder to be shared with practical jurisprudence principles, since
they firstly are concerned to justify the law, on an essentially moral basis. This
justification is quite hard to maintain from a practical point of view.
The coherence of “the law” in both approaches is essential. A debate on
whether coherence is built-in by the restrictions induced by Nature in an evo-
lutionary way, or whether coherence should be an object of knowledge manage-
ment, seems to be a long debate. Despite that, legal positivism seems to be
more suitable to Legal Artificial Intelligence. From the logical point of view,
the natural approach is also harder to deal with than the positivist one. When
describing a morally desired state-of-affairs, the logical statements take the form
of propositions that has as a model best of the moral worlds. Deontic logic is
suitable to be used to fulfill this task. However, a legal statement (“a law”)
is essentially an individual sentence that can also be seen as an order (manda-
tory command), and hence, it is not a proposition at all. As a consequence,
deontic logic is not appropriate to be used in knowledge bases. Besides that,
(Valente, 1995) shows that deontic logic does not properly distinguish between
the normative status of a situation from the normative status of a norm (rule).
We think that the best jurisprudence basis for Legal ontologies and reasoning is
Legal positivism. Thus, we will be talking a legal ontology as an ontology about
(individual) laws, and not an ontology on “the law”.
Hans Kelsen initialized the Legal positivism tradition in 1934, for a contempo-
rary reference see (Kelsen, 1991). He used this positive aspect of the legislature
to define a theory of pure law and applied it to the problem of transfer citizen’s
rights and obligations from one country to other when crossing boarders. He
produces a quite good understanding of what nowadays we denominate Private
International Law. This achievement was so important that in many refer-
ences on international law, Kelsen jurisprudence is the basis for discussions on
conflict-of-laws derived from different statements coming from different fori. 1
In what follows we introduce the main terminology and concepts of Kelsenian
jurisprudence that we use in this article. We can summarize Kelsen theory of
pure law in three principles:
1. According to what was discussed above, individually valid legal statements
are the first-class citizens of our ontology. Thus, only inhabitants of the
1“It is one of Kelsen’s frequently repeated doctrines that conflict of norms, in the absence
of a normative procedure for resolving the conflict, shatters the concept of a unified system”,
is highly emphasized in Hughes (Hughes, 1971), for example, and it is one of the principles
most cited when Kelsen jurisprudence is presented.
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Legal knowledge base are individual laws, see (Kelsen, 1967, supra note
5, pp 9-10) 2. For example, if it is the case that Maria is married with
John, and, this was legally celebrated, then “Maria-married-with-John”
is an individually valid legal statement, and hence, it is a member of the
Legal Ontology;
2. Kelsen also says that that the validity of a legal norm can only be provided
concerning the validity of another, and higher, one. So, n1, a norm, is
legally valid if, and only if, it was created or promulgated in agreement
with other, and higher, legally valid norm, n2. This justification induces
a precedence relationship between norms that is transitive, that is, if n1
precedes n2, and, n2 precedes n3, then n1 recedes n3;
3
3. There is a mechanism for relating laws from one Legal system to another,
the so-called “choice-of-law rule”. This mechanism is very important to
the development of a concept of International Law. Assume that Mary-
is-married-with-John is an individual legal statement in legal system A.
Assume also that Mary is a citizen of a country adopting legal systemB. Is
there any legal statement in B ensuring that Mary is married in B? Well,
this depends on B itself, but there is a way to connected the individual law
Mary-is-married-with-John in A to Mary-is-married-with-John in B. In
some legal systems, this is accomplished by what Kelsen denominated “a
connection”. As shown in the following quotation from (Kelsen, 1946, page
247), the connection between the laws of A and B is made by reference,
but, in fact, each law belongs to its respective legal system. In this specific
case we can consider Mary-is-married-with-John in system A is connected
to Mary-is-married-with-John in legal system B the connection Lex Loci
Celebrationis.
... the law of one State prescribes the application of the law of
another State, and the latter does not object or demand it. It
has no right to do so since it is not really its own law which
is applied by the other State. The latter applies norms of its
own law. The fact that these norms have the same contents
as corresponding norms of another State does not concern the
latter...Since the specific technique of these norms consists in
“referring” to the norms of another system and by so doing in-
corporating norms of identical contents into their own legal sys-
tem, it would be more justifiable to call them “reference rules”...
The reference rule, that is ... the norm regulating the applica-
tion of foreign law, may be distinguished from the norm to be
applied, that is, the norm referred to. Only the former is a
2Kelsen takes norms and valid norms as synonyms. To say that a legal norm is valid is to
say that it exists, is affirmed by Kelsen
3See (Kelsen, 1967, supra note 5, p. 196-7). This can be also found in (Kelsen, 1946,
supra note 5, p. 110-1)
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norm of private international law. But from a functional point
of view, the one is essentially connected with the other.
Nowadays it is a common terminology in Private International Law the use of
the connecting factors or legal connections between individual laws in a different
legal system. Only to enumerate some of them: Lex-Domicilii, Lex-Patriae, Lex-
loci-contratum, Lex-loci-solutionis, etc.
There is a philosophical problem with the principle 2 above. It demands the
existence of basic laws. These basic laws do not have their validity/existence as
a consequence of other more basic laws. Kelsen name these basic laws Grund-
norms. Their validity is based on legislature acts and in a certain sense is
derived from the sovereign of the State. It is out of the scope of this article
to discuss such problem in Kelsen’s jurisprudence. We take as granted that
Kelsen jurisprudence can adequately support most of the existent legal systems,
a definitively not an unreal working hypothesis.
From the three principles above, we have some very simple ontological com-
mitments:
I Individuals are laws;
II There is a transitive and reflexive relationship between individual laws that
reflects the natural precedence relationship between laws;
III There are legal connections between individual laws in different legal sys-
tems or between different fori in the same broader legal system.
From these commitments, we derive the basic constructs of the logic iALC.
In the first place, our legal ontology relates concepts to legal systems. Descrip-
tion logics uses nominals to refer to individuals. So, an expression as i : A,
stands for i is an individual law, belonging to the legal system A, a concept.
From commitment 2 we consider an expression as i  j standing for the
individual law i legally precedes individual law j. The subsumption relationship
A ⊆ B, from description logic, denotes that A is a legal subsystem of B. One
could interpret this relation as the inclusion relationship. 4 We discuss the
implications of using negated contents together with Kelsenian jurisprudence in
the following. This can be found in (Haeusler, de Paiva, & Rademaker, 2011,
2010; Haeusler, Paiva, & Rademaker, 2010; Haeusler, de Paiva, & Rademaker,
2010) too.
Under the classical setting, a negated concept ¬A denotes the set of all
inhabitants of the domain that do not belong to the interpretation of A. Under
ontological commitment 2 there is no individual law that does not exist in,
belong to, the domain. Since norms and laws are not propositions, it is a
complete nonsense to negate a law. As we already seen, we can negate a concept
on laws. Consider the collection of all Brazilian individual laws. Call it BR.
In a classical setting BR ⊔ ¬BR is the universe of laws. Thus, any law that
4In Classical ALC this is just the case, but we shown here that classical reasoning it is not
a good choice for dealing with legal ontologies
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it is not in BR has to be a law outside BR, that is, belonging to ¬BR. For
example, if Peter is 17 years old, it is not liable according to the Brazilian
law. Is PeterIsLiable a valid law at all? If so, it has to belong to ¬BR.
Using Kelsen in a classical setting, individual laws not belonging to a concept
automatically belong to its complementary concept. The problem with this
is that it is possible to create laws outside a jurisdiction or forum by the very
simple act of considering or experimenting a legal situation. Nowadays in Brazil,
the parliament is discussing the liability under the 16 years. By the simple fact
of discussing the validity of their corresponding individual laws, we are forced
to accept they exist outside the Brazilian legal system. We do not consider this
feature appropriate to legal ontology definition. Dealing with negations every
time we assume the existence of a law may bring unnecessary complexity to
legal ontology definition. Because the precedence relationship between laws, cf.
ontological commitment 2, there is a natural alternative to classical logic, the
intuitionistic logic (IL). According to IL semantics, i : ¬A, iff, for each law j,
such that i  j, it is not the case that j : A. This semantics means that i does
not provide any legal support for any individual law belong to A, which agrees
with Kelsen jurisprudence on the hierarchy of individual laws.
Commitment 2 gives rise to expressions of the form m LexLociCelebra-
tionism, wherem isMaryIsMarriedWithJohn and LexLociCelebratio-
nis is a legal connection. Thus, if Abroad is the concept that represents all laws
in Portugal, then the concept ∃ LexLociCelebrationis Portugal represents
the Brazilian individual laws stating that Portuguese marriage is valid in Brazil.
The private international law of any country is a collection of laws stated in simi-
lar ways for every possible legal connection. In (Haeusler, de Paiva, & Rademaker,
2010) it is shown in detail a judicial case deriving that a renting contract is solv-
ing a conflict of laws in space through private international law.
3 Some philosophical discussion on the ontolog-
ical criteria taken on using Kelsen in legal on-
tologies
We base our work on two ontological criteria: 5 1- Ontological Commitment
(due to W.Quine), our logical approach is ontologically committed to Valid
Legal Statements only, as discussed in section 2. The only nominals occurring
in our logic language are valid individual laws, and; 2-Ontological Parsimony,
which is strongly related to Quine’s ontological commitment too, with a mention
of its stronger version also known as Occam’s Razor, here denoted as OR. The
second criteria is based on: “One ‘easy’ case where OR can be straightforwardly
applied is when a theory T, postulates entities which are explanatorily idle.
Excising these entities from T produces a second theory, T*, which has the
5see Quine’s “OnWhat there is” article and http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/simplicity,
for example to a primer ontological criteria
6
4 THE LOGIC IALC
same theoretical virtues as T but a smaller set of ontological commitments.
Hence, according to OR, it is rational to pick T* over T.”
We observe that nominals, representing individuals, denote only valid indi-
vidual laws and nothing in the iALC language described in the following section,
is committed with non-valid individual laws, according to the second ontological
criterion above, we do not have to consider non-valid individual laws. Techni-
cally speaking there is no element in the iALC language able to denote an
invalid individual law in any model of any iALC theory. If something is a valid
individual law regarded some legal system in some place in the world, then this
individual belongs to our semantic universe.
This philosophical basis allows us to have only sets of valid individuals as
semantics for iALC theories. Thus, as the a reviewer have already observed,
this implies that ¬A is the set of individual laws holding outside Brazil, and
the classical negation is not adequate to denote this set. If we get ¬A meaning
“individual laws that do not hold in Brazil”, the set of laws being a proper
subset of the universe, and A is the conjunctive property “laws + holds in
A”. Then the complement, ¬A would be all elements of the universe which are
either not a valid individual law or do not hold in Brazil. But there is no way
to take the semantics in this way, for the semantics we get from the ontological
commitment 2 from section 2 is given by “The individual valid laws holding
outside of Brazil”.
Finally, concerning contradictory individual laws, they can coexist in the
same universe, since they are there because they hold in distinct legal sys-
tems. In fact they are apparently contradictory. For example, “There is death
penalty” and “Death sentence is not allowed” can coexist, since there are coun-
tries where each of these legal statement are valid. Concretely: “There is death
penalty”:Iran and “Death sentence is not allowed”:Brazil.
4 The Logic iALC
Classical Description Logic has been widely used as a basis for ontology creation
and reasoning in many knowledge specific domains, including Legal AI.
An adequate intuitionistic semantics for negation in a legal domain comes
to the fore when we take legally valid individual statements as the inhabitants
of our legal ontology. This allows us to elegantly deal with particular situa-
tions of legal coherence, such as conflict of laws, as those solved by Private
International Law analysis. In (Haeusler, de Paiva, & Rademaker, 2010, 2010;
Haeusler, Paiva, & Rademaker, 2010) we present an Intuitionistic Description
Logic, called iALC for Intuitionistic ALC (for Attributive Language with Com-
plements, the canonical classical description logic system). A labeled sequent
calculus for iALC based on a labeled sequent calculus for ALC (Rademaker,
2012), was also presented. In these previous articles, we discussed the jurispru-
dence foundation of our system, and show how we can perform a coherence anal-
ysis of “Conflict of Laws in Space” by means of iALC. This conflict happens
when several laws can be applied, with different outcomes, to a case depending
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on the place where the case occurs. Typical examples are those ruling the rights
of a citizen abroad.
In (Haeusler, de Paiva, & Rademaker, 2010), the semantics of iALC is pre-
cisely provided and follows the framework for constructive modal logics pre-
sented by Simpson (Simpson, 1993) and adapted to description languages by
Paiva (de Paiva, 2006). In the cited reference, we applied iALC to the problem
of formalizing legal knowledge.
Description Logics are an important knowledge representation formalism,
unifying and giving a logical basis to the well known AI frame-based systems of
the eighties. Description logics are very popular right now. Given the existent
and proposed applications of the Semantic Web, there has been a fair amount of
work into finding the most well-behaved system of description logic that has the
broadest application, for any specific domain. Description logics tend to come in
families of logical systems, depending on which concept constructors you allow
in the logic. Since description logics came into existence as fragments of first-
order logic chosen to find the best trade-off possible between expressiveness and
tractability of the fragment, several systems were discussed and in the taxonomy
of systems that emerged the ALC has come to be known as the canonical one.
The basic building blocks of description logics are concepts, roles and individuals.
Concepts are described as unary predicates in usual first-order logic and roles
as binary atomic predicates used to modify the concepts.
As discussed in (de Paiva, 2006), considering versions of constructive descrip-
tion logics makes sense, both from a theoretical and from a practical viewpoint.
There are several possible and sensible ways of defining constructive description
logics, whether your motivation is natural language semantics, (de Paiva, 2006),
or Legal AI, (Haeusler, de Paiva, & Rademaker, 2010). As far as constructive
description logics are concerned, Mendler and Scheele have worked out a very
compelling system cALC (Mendler & Scheele, 2010), based on the constructive
modal logic CK (Bellin, de Paiva, & Ritter, 2001)), one possible choice for us.
However in this note we follow a different path and describe a constructive ver-
sion of ALC, based on the framework for constructive modal logics developed
by Simpson (the system IK) in his phd thesis (Simpson, 1993) (For a proof-
theoretic comparison between the constructive modal logics CK and IK one can
see (Ranalter, 2010)).
Our motivation, besides Simpson’s work, is the framework developed by
Brau¨ner and de Paiva in (Brau¨ner & de Paiva, 2006) for constructive Hybrid
Logics. We reason that having already frameworks for constructive modal and
constructive hybrid logics in the labelled style of Simpson, we might end up
with the best style of constructive description logics, in terms of both solid
foundations and ease of implementation. Since submitting this paper we have
been told about the master thesis of Cle´ment (Cle´ment, 2008) which follows
broadly similar lines. Cle´ment proves soundness and completeness of this system
and then provides a focused version of it, a very interesting development, as
focused systems are, apparently, very useful for proof search.
Building up from the Simpson’s constructive modal logics (called here IML),
in (Brau¨ner & de Paiva, 2006), it is introduced intuitionistic hybrid logics, de-
8
5 INTUITIONISTIC ALC
noted by IHL. Hybrid logics add to usual modal logics a new kind of propositional
symbols, the nominals, and also the so-called satisfaction operators. A nominal
is assumed to be true at exactly one world, so a nominal can be considered the
name of a world. If x is a nominal and X is an arbitrary formula, then a new
formula x :X called a satisfaction statement can be formed. The satisfaction
statement x :X expresses that the formula X is true at one particular world,
namely the world denoted by x. In hindsight one can see that IML shares
with hybrid formalisms the idea of making the possible-world semantics part
of the deductive system. While IML makes the relationship between worlds
(e.g., xRy) part of the deductive system, IHL goes one step further and sees
the worlds themselves x, y as part of the deductive system, (as they are now
nominals) and the satisfaction relation itself as part of the deductive system, as
it is now a syntactic operator, with modality-like properties.
Our Sequent Calculus for iALC was first presented in (de Paiva, Hausler, & Rademaker,
2010) where we briefly described the immediate properties of this system and
most importantly we discuss a case study of the use of iALC in legal AI.
A very importante obsertation is that this article corrects and extends the
presentation of iALC appearing in all previous articles. It points out the differ-
ence between iALC and the intuitionistic hybrid logic presented in (de Paiva,
2006). Completeness and soundness proofs are revised. A discussion on the
computational complexity of iALC is also taken.
5 Intuitionistic ALC
The iALC logic is based on the framework for intuitionistic modal logic IK pro-
posed in (Simpson, 1993; Fischer-Servi, 1984; Plotkin & Stirling, 1986). These
modal logics arise from interpreting the usual possible worlds definitions in an
intuitionistic meta-theory. As we will see in the following paragraphs, ideas
from (Brau¨ner & de Paiva, 2006) were also used, where the framework IHL, for
intuitionistic hybrid logics, is introduced. iALC concepts are described as:
C,D ::= A | ⊥ | ⊤ | ¬C | C ⊓D | C ⊔D | C ⊑ D | ∃R.C | ∀R.C
where C,D stands for concepts, A for an atomic concept, R for an atomic role.
We could have used distinct symbols for subsumption of concepts and the sub-
sumption concept constructor but this would blow-up the calculus presentation.
This syntax is more general than standard ALC since it includes subsumption
⊑ as a concept-forming operator. We have no use for nested subsumptions, but
they do make the system easier to define, so we keep the general rules. Nega-
tion could be defined via subsumption, that is, ¬C = C ⊑ ⊥, but we find it
convenient to keep it in the language. The constant ⊤ could also be omitted
since it can be represented as ¬⊥.
A constructive interpretation of iALC is a structure I consisting of a non-
empty set ∆I of entities in which each entity represents a partially defined
individual; a refinement pre-ordering I on ∆I , i.e., a reflexive and transitive
9
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relation; and an interpretation function ·I mapping each role name R to a binary
relation RI ⊆ ∆I ×∆I and atomic concept A to a set AI ⊆ ∆I which is closed
under refinement, i.e., x ∈ AI and x I y implies y ∈ AI . The interpretation
I is lifted from atomic concepts to arbitrary concepts via:
⊤I =df ∆I
⊥I =df ∅
(¬C)I =df {x | ∀y ∈ ∆I .x  y ⇒ y 6∈ CI}
(C ⊓D)I =df C
I ∩DI
(C ⊔D)I =df CI ∪DI
(C ⊑ D)I =df {x | ∀y ∈ ∆I .(x  y and y ∈ CI)⇒ y ∈ DI}
(∃R.C)I =df {x | ∃y ∈ ∆I .(x, y) ∈ RI and y ∈ CI}
(∀R.C)I =df {x | ∀y ∈ ∆I .x  y ⇒ ∀z ∈ ∆I .(y, z) ∈ RI ⇒ z ∈ CI}
Following the semantics of IK, the structures I are models for iALC if they
satisfy two frame conditions:
F1 if w ≤ w′ and wRv then ∃v′.w′Rv′ and v ≤ v′
F2 if v ≤ v′ and wRv then ∃w′.w′Rv′ and w ≤ w′
The above conditions are diagrammatically expressed as:
w′
R //
(F1)
v′
w
R //
≤
OO
v
≤
OO and w
′ R //
(F2)
v′
w
R //
≤
OO
v
≤
OO
Our setting simplifies (Mendler & Scheele, 2010), since iALC satisfies (like
classical ALC) ∃R.⊥ = ⊥ and ∃R.(C ⊔D) = ∃R.C ⊔ ∃R.D.
In contrast with the above mentioned approaches, ours assign a truth values
to some formulas, also called assertions, they are not concepts as in (Brau¨ner & de Paiva,
2006), for example. Below we define the syntax of general assertions (A) and
nominal assertions (N) for ABOX reasoning in iALC. Formulas (F ) also in-
cludes subsumption of concepts interpreted as propositional statements.
N ::= x : C | x : N A ::= N | xRy F ::= A | C ⊑ C
where x and y are nominals, R is a role symbol and C is a concept. In particular,
this allows x : (y : C), which is a perfectly valid nominal assertion.
Definition 1 (outer nominal) In a nominal assertion x : γ, x is said to be the
outer nominal of this assertion. That is, in an assertion of the form x : (y : γ),
x is the outer nominal.
We write I, w |= C to abbreviate w ∈ CI which means that entity w satisfies
concept C in the interpretation I6. Further, I is a model of C, written I |= C
6In IHL, this w is a world and this satisfaction relation is possible world semantics
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iff ∀w ∈ I, we have that I, w |= C. Finally, |= C means ∀I, we have that
I |= C. All previous notions are extended to sets Φ of concepts in the usual
universal fashion. Given the hybrid satisfaction statements, the interpretation
and semantic satisfaction relation are extended in the expected way. The state-
ment I, w |= x : C holds, if and only if, ∀zx 
I x , we have that, I, zx |= C. In a
similar fashion, I, w |= xRy holds ,if and only if, ∀zx  x.∀zy  y.(xIx , z
I
y ) ∈ R
I .
That is, the evaluation of the hybrid formulas does not take into account only
the world w, but it has to be monotonically preserved. It can be observed that
for every w′, if xI  w′ and I, x′ |= α, then I, w′ |= α is a property holding on
this satisfaction relation.
In common reasoning tasks the interpretation I and the entity w in a verifica-
tion goal such as I, w |= δ are not given directly but are themselves axiomatized
by sets of concepts and formulas. Usually we have a set Θ 7 of formulas and
the set Γ of concepts. Accordingly:
Definition 2 We write Θ,Γ |= δ if it is the case that:
∀I. if (∀x ∈ ∆I .(I, x |= Θ)
then ∀(Nom(Γ, δ)).∀~z  Nom(Γ, δ).(I, ~z |= Γ⇒ I, ~z |= δ) (1)
where ~z denotes a vector of variables z1, . . . , zk and Nom(Γ, δ) is the vector of
all outer nominals occurring in each nominal assertion of Γ∪{δ}. x is the only
outer nominal of a nominal assertion {x : γ}, while a (pure) concept γ has no
outer nominal.
A Hilbert calculus for iALC is provided following (Plotkin & Stirling, 1986;
Simpson, 1993; Fischer-Servi, 1984). It consists of all axioms of intuitionis-
tic propositional logic plus the axioms and rules displayed in Figure 1. The
Hilbert calculus implements TBox-reasoning. That is, it decides the semantical
relationship Θ, ∅ |= C. Θ has only formulas as members.
0. all substitution instances of theorems of IPL
1. ∀R.(C ⊑ D) ⊑ (∀R.C ⊑ ∀R.D)
2. ∃R.(C ⊑ D) ⊑ (∃R.C ⊑ ∃R.D)
3. ∃R.(C ⊔D) ⊑ (∃R.C ⊔ ∃R.D)
4. ∃R.⊥ ⊑ ⊥
5. (∃R.C ⊑ ∀R.C) ⊑ ∀R.(C ⊑ D)
MP If C and C ⊑ D are theorems, D is a theorem too.
Nec If C is a theorem then ∀R.C is a theorem too.
Figure 1: The iALC axiomatization
7Here we consider only acycled TBox with ⊑ and ≡.
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A Sequent Calculus for iALC is also provided. The logical rules of the Se-
quent Calculus for iALC are presented in Figure 2. 8 The structural rules and
the cut rule are omitted but they are as usual. The δ stands for concepts or
assertions (x : C or xRy), α and β for concept and R for role. ∆ is a set of for-
mulas. In rules p-∃ and p-∀, the syntax ∀R.∆ means {∀R.α | α ∈ concepts(∆)},
that is, all concepts in ∆ are universal quantified with the same role. The as-
sertions in ∆ are kept unmodified. In the same way, in rule p-N the addition
of the nominal is made only in the concepts of ∆ (and in δ if that is a concept)
keeping the assertions unmodified.
The propositional connectives (⊓,⊔,⊑) rules are as usual, the rule ⊔2-r is
omitted. The rules are presented without nominals but for each of these rules
there is a counterpart with nominals. For example, the rule ⊑-r has one similar:
∆, x : α⇒ x : β
n-⊑-r
∆⇒ x : (α ⊑ β)
The main modification comes for the modal rules, which are now role quan-
tification rules. We must keep the intuitionistic constraints for modal operators.
Rule ∃-l has the usual condition that y is not in the conclusion. Concerning the
usual condition on the ∀-r rule, it is not the case in this system, for the inter-
pretation of the a nominal assertion in a sequent is already implicitly universal
(Definition 2).
Theorem 1 The sequent calculus described in Fig. 2 is sound and complete for
TBox reasoning, that is Θ, ∅ |= C if and only if Θ ⇒ C is derivable with the
rules of Figure 2.
The completeness of our system is proved relative to the axiomatization of
iALC, shown in Figure 1. The proof is presented in Section 6.
The soundness of the system is proved directly from the semantics of iALC
including the ABOX, that is, including nominals. The semantics of a sequent
is defined by the satisfaction relation, as shown in Definition 2. The sequent
Θ,Γ ⇒ δ is valid if and only if Θ,Γ |= γ. Soundness is proved by showing
that each sequent rule preserves the validity of the sequent and that the initial
sequent is valid. This proof is presented in Section 7.
We note that although we have here fixed some inaccuracies in the presen-
tation of the iALC semantics in (de Paiva et al., 2010), the system presented
here is basically the same, excepted that here the propositional rules are pre-
sented without nominals. Given that, the soundness of the system proved in
(de Paiva et al., 2010) can be still considered valid without further problems.
Note also that the proof of soundness provides in Section 7 is regarded the full
language of iALC. It considers nominals and assertion on nominals relation-
ship, that is it concerns ABOX and TBOX. The proof of completeness is for the
TBOX only. A proof of completeness for ABOX can be done by the method
8The reader may want to read Proof Theory books, for example, (Takeuti, 2013; Buss,
1998; Negri & Von Plato, 2008; Girard, Taylor, & Lafont, 1989).
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∆, δ ⇒ δ ∆, x : ⊥ ⇒ δ
∆, xRy ⇒ y : α
∀-r
∆⇒ x : ∀R.α
∆, x : ∀R.α, y : α, xRy ⇒ δ
∀-l
∆, x : ∀R.α, xRy ⇒ δ
∆⇒ xRy ∆⇒ y : α
∃-r
∆⇒ x : ∃R.α
∆, xRy, y : α⇒ δ
∃-l
∆, x : ∃R.α⇒ δ
∆, α⇒ β
⊑-r
∆⇒ α ⊑ β
∆1 ⇒ α ∆2, β ⇒ δ
⊑-l
∆1,∆2, α ⊑ β ⇒ δ
∆⇒ α ∆⇒ β
⊓-r
∆⇒ α ⊓ β
∆, α, β ⇒ δ
⊓-l
∆, α ⊓ β ⇒ δ
∆⇒ α ⊔1-r
∆⇒ α ⊔ β
∆, α⇒ δ ∆, β ⇒ δ
⊔-l
∆, α ⊔ β ⇒ δ
∆, α⇒ β
p-∃
∀R.∆, ∃R.α⇒ ∃R.β
∆⇒ α p-∀
∀R.∆⇒ ∀R.α
∆⇒ δ p-N
x : ∆⇒ x : δ
Figure 2: The System SCiALC : logical rules
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of canonical models. For the purposes of this article, we choose to show the
relative completeness proof with the sake of showing a simpler proof concerning
TBOX.
6 The completeness of SCiALC system
We show the relative completeness of SCiALC regarding the axiomatic presen-
tation of iALC presented in Figure 1. To prove the completeness of SCiALC it
is sufficient to derive in SCiALC the axioms 1–5 of iALC. It is clear that all
substitution instances of IPL theorems can also be proved in SCiALC using only
propositional rules. The MP rule is a derived rule from the SCiALC using the
cut rule. The Nec rule is the p-∀ rule in the system with ∆ empty. In the first
two proofs below do not use nominals for given better intuition of the reader
about the use of rules with and without nominals.
Axiom 1:
α⇒ α β ⇒ β
⊑-l
α ⊑ β, α⇒ β
p-∃
∀R.(α ⊑ β), ∃R.α⇒ ∃R.β
⊑-r
∀R.(α ⊑ β)⇒ ∃R.α ⊑ ∃R.β
Axiom 2:
α⇒ α β ⇒ β
⊑-l
α ⊑ β, α⇒ β
p-∀
∀R.(α ⊑ β), ∀R.α⇒ ∀R.β
⊑-r
∀R.(α ⊑ β)⇒ ∀R.α ⊑ ∀R.β
Axiom 3:
xRy, y : ⊥ ⇒ x : ⊥
∃-l
x : ∃R.⊥ ⇒ x : ⊥ ⊑-r
⇒ x : (∃R.⊥ ⊑ ⊥)
Axiom 4:
x : ∃R.α⇒ x : ∃R.α
⊔1-r
x : ∃R.α⇒ x : (∃R.α ⊔ ∃R.β)
x : ∃R.β ⇒ x : ∃R.β
⊔2-r
x : ∃R.β ⇒ x : (∃R.α ⊔ ∃R.β)
⊔-l
x : ∃R.(α ⊔ β)⇒ x : (∃R.α ⊔ ∃R.β)
Axiom 5:
xRy, y : α⇒ y : α xRy, y : α⇒ xRy
∃-r
xRy, y : α⇒ x : ∃R.α
xRy, y : α, y : β,∀R.β ⇒ y : β
∀-l
xRy, y : α, x : ∀R.β ⇒ y : β
⊑-l
x : (∃R.α ⊑ ∀R.β), xRy, y : α⇒ y : β
∀-r
x : (∃R.α ⊑ ∀R.β), xRy ⇒ y : (α ⊑ β)
∀-r
x : (∃R.α ⊑ ∀R.β)⇒ x : ∀R.(α ⊑ β)
⊑-r
⇒ x : [(∃R.α ⊑ ∀R.β) ⊑ ∀R.(α ⊑ β)]
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7 Soundness of SCiALC system
In this section we prove that.
Proposition 1 If Θ,Γ⇒ δ is provable in SCiALC then Θ,Γ |= γ.
Proof: We prove that each sequent rule preserves the validity of the sequent
and that the initial sequents are valid. The definition of a valid sequent (Θ,Γ |=
γ) is presented in Definition 2.
The validity of the axioms is trivial. We first observe that any application
of the rules ⊑-r, ⊑-l,⊓-r,⊓-l, ⊔1-r,⊔2-r, ⊔-l of SCiALC where the sequents do not
have any nominal, neither in Θ nor in Γ, is sound regarded intuitionistic propo-
sitional logic kripke semantics, to which the validity definition above collapses
whenever there is no nominal in the sequents. Thus, in this proof we concen-
trate in the case where there are nominals. We first observe that the nominal
version of ⊑-r, the validity of the premises includes
∀(Nom(Γ, δ)).∀~z  Nom(Γ, δ).(I, ~z |= Γ⇒ I, ~z |= δ)
This means that Γ holds in any worlds ~z  ~x for the vector ~x of nominals
occurring in Γ. This includes the outer nominal xi in δ (if any). In this case the
semantics of ⊑ is preserved, since ~z includes zi  xi. With the sake of a more
detailed analysis, we consider the following instance:
x : α1, y : α2 ⇒ x : β
⊑-r
α1 ⇒ x : α2 ⊑ β
Consider an iALC structure I = 〈U ,, RI . . . , CI〉 In this case, for any I
and any z1, z2 ∈ UI if z1  xI , z1  yI , such that, I, zi |= α1 and I, zi |= α2,
we have that I, zi |= x : β, since the premise is valid, by hypothesis. In this
case, by the semantics of ⊑ we have I, zi |= x : α1 ⊑ β. The conclusion of the
rule is valid too.
The argument shown above for the ⊑-r rule is analogous for the nominal
versions of ⊑-r, ⊑-l,⊓-r,⊓-l, ⊔1-r,⊔2-r, ⊔-l. Consider the rule ∀-r.
∆, xRy ⇒ y : α
∀-r
∆⇒ x : ∀R.α
Since the premise is valid we have that if ∀zx  xI , ∀zy  yI , (zx, zy) ∈ RI
then ∀zy  yI .I, zy |= γ. This entails that xI ∈ (∀R.γ)I , for xI  xI . We
observe that by the restriction on the rule application, y does not occur in ∆,
it only occurs in xRy and y : α. The truth of these formulas are subsumed by
∀R.γ. The conclusion does not need to consider them any more. The conclusion
is valid too. Another way to see its soundness is to prove that if xRy ⇒ y : α
is valid, then so is ⇒ x : ∀R.α. This can be show by the following reasoning:
∀xI∀yI∀zx∀zy(zx  x
I → (zy  y
I → ((zx, zy) ∈ R
I → I, zy |= y : α)))
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that is the same as:
∀xI∀yI∀zx∀zy(zx  x
I → (zy  y
I → ((zx, zy) ∈ R
I → I, yI |= α)))
Using the fact that ∀yI(yI  yI), we obtain:
∀xI∀zx(zx  x
I → ∀yI((zx, y
I) ∈ RI → I, yI |= α))
The above condition states that ⇒ x : ∀R.α is valid.
∀xI∀yI∀zx∀zy(zx  x
I → (zy  y
I → ((zx, zy) ∈ R
I → I, zy |= y : α)))
Consider the rule ∀-l:
∆, x : ∀R.α, y : α, xRy ⇒ δ
∀-l
∆, x : ∀R.α, xRy ⇒ δ
As in the ∀-r case, we analyze the simplest validity preservation: if x :
∀R.α ∧ xRy is valid, then so is x : ∀R.α ∧ y : α ∧ xRy. The first condition is:
∀xI∀yI∀zx(zx  x
I → ∀zy(zy  y
I →
((I, zy |= x : ∀R.α) ∧ (I, zy |= x : ∀R.α) ∧ ((zx, zy) ∈ R
I)→
(I, zy |= y : α) ∧ (I, zx |= y : α)))) (2)
Using zy = y
I , eliminating zx from the term, and, using the fact that I, zy |=
y : α is valid, iff, I, yI |= α , we obtain
∀xI∀yI∀zx(zx  x
I → ∀zy(zy  y
I →
((I, zy |= x : ∀R.α) ∧ (I, zy |= x : ∀R.α) ∧ ((zx, zy) ∈ R
I)→ (I, y |= α)))) (3)
Consider the semantics of ∃R.α:
(∃R.α)I =df {x | ∃y ∈ U
I .(x, y) ∈ RI and y ∈ αI}
and the following rule:
∆⇒ xRy ∆⇒ y : α
∃-r
∆⇒ x : ∃R.α
We can see that the premises of the rule entails the conclusion. The premises
correspond to the following conditions:
∀xI∀yI∀zx(zx  x
I → ∀zy(zy  y
I → ((zx, zy) ∈ R
I)))
and
∀yI∀zy(zy  y
I → ((I, zy |= y : α)))
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Instantiating in both conditions zy = y
I and zx = x
I , this yields (xI , yI) ∈ RI ,
such that I, yI |= α, so I, zx |= xI : ∃R.α. Thus, ∃-r is sound. The soundness
of ∃-l is analogous to ∀-l.
Finally, it is worth noting that, for each rule, we can derive the soundness
of its non-nominal version from the proof of soundness of its nominal version.
For instance, the soundness of the nominal version of rule ⊔-l depends on the
diamond conditions F1 and F2. The soundness of its non-nomimal version, is a
consequence of the soundness of the nominal version.
The rules below have their soundness proved as a consequence of the fol-
lowing reasonings in first-order intuitionistic logic that are used for deriving the
semantics of the conclusions from the semantics of the premises:
(p-∃) ∀x(A(x) ∧B(x)→ C(x)) |= ∀xA(x) ∧ ∃xB(x)→ ∃xC(x);
(p-∀) (A(x) |= B(x)) implies ∀y(R(y, x)→ A(x)) |= ∀y(R(y, x)→ B(x));
(p-N) if A |= B then for every Kripke model I and world xI , if I, xI |= A
then I, xI |= B.
∆, α⇒ β
p-∃
∀R.∆, ∃R.α⇒ ∃R.β
∆⇒ α p-∀
∀R.∆⇒ ∀R.α
∆⇒ δ p-N
x : ∆⇒ x : δ
8 Solving Chisholm and other contrary-to-duty
paradoxes in iALC
The paradoxes discussed in this section are known from the literature as contrary-
to-duty paradoxes. They are deontic paradoxes under SDL formalization. Usu-
ally, there is a primary norm/law/obligation and a secondary norm that comes
to effect when the primary obligation is violated. The form of these normative
and intuitively coherent situations are in general hard to find a consistent deon-
tic formalization. Because of that they are called paradoxes. A typical example
of contrary-to-duty paradox appeared in (M., 1963):
1. It ought to be that Jones goes to the assistance of his neighbors.
2. It ought to be that if Jones does go then he tells them he is coming.
3. If Jones doesn’t go, then he ought not tell them he is coming.
4. Jones doesn’t go.
• This certainly appears to describe a possible situation. 1-4 constitute a
mutually consistent and logically independent set of sentences.
• (1) is a primary obligation, what Jones ought to do unconditionally. (2) is
a compatible-with-duty obligation, appearing to say (in the context of 1)
what else Jones ought to do on the condition that Jones fulfills his primary
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obligation. (3) is a contrary-to-duty obligation (CTD) appearing to say
(in the context of 1) what Jones ought to do conditional on his violating
his primary obligation. (4) is a factual claim, which conjoined with (1),
implies that Jones violates his primary obligation.
We firstly remember the deontic approch to law and its logic. Differently
of ours, it takes laws as propositions. Thus, a norm or law is an obligatory
proposition, such as “You must pay your debits” or “It is obligatory to pay the
debits”. As a proposition each norm has a truth value. The underlying logic
classical. If φ is a proposition then Oφ is a proposition too. Oφ intuitively means
φ must be the case ,or It is obligatory that φ. The paradoxes that we discuss
in this work appear just when laws are taken as propositions. They show them
up from the most basic deontic logic Standard Deontic Logic (SDL). SDL is a
modal logic defined by von Wright19951 (Wright, 1951) and, according to the
modal logic terminology on the names of axioms, it is defined by the following
set of axioms. The formulas of SDL include the modality O.
TAUT all tautologies of the language. This means that if φ is a propositional
tautology then the substitution of p for any SDL formula is an SDL tau-
tology too;
OB-K O(p→ q)→ (Op→ Oq)
OB-D Op→ ¬O¬p
MP if ⊢ p and ⊢ p→ q then ⊢ q
OB-NEC if ⊢ p then ⊢ Op
SDL is just the normal modal logic D or KD, with a suggestive notation
expressing the intended interpretation. From these, we can prove the principle
that obligations cannot conflict, NC of SDL, ¬(Op ∧O¬p), see (Wright, 1951).
The following set of formulas is a straightforward formalization of Chisholm
paradox in SDL.
1. Op
2. O(p→ q)
3. ¬p→ O¬q
4. ¬p
The intuitive meaning of each formula is according the table shown in figure 3
where p is “Jones go to the assistance of his neighbours” and q is “Jones tells
his neighbours he is going”.
Using the deductive power of SDL we can perform the following derivation
of a SDL contradiction.
• from (2) by principle OB-K we get Op→ Oq,
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Assertion SDL Formula
It ought to be that Jones go to
the assistance of his neighbours. O(p)
It ought to be that if Jones does go then
he tells them he is going. O(p→ q)
If Jones doesn’t go, then
he ought not tell them he is going. ¬p→ O(¬q)
Jones doesn’t go. ¬p
Figure 3: Assertions of the Chisholm paradox and their representation in SDL
• and then from (1) by MP, we get Oq;
• but by MP alone we get O¬q from (3) and (4).
• From these two conclusions, by PC, we get Oq ∧O¬q , contradicting NC
of SDL.
Assertion 1-4, from Chisholm paradox, leads to inconsistency per SDL. But,
1-4 do not seem inconsistent at all, the representation cannot be a faithful
one. We discuss this in the sequel. For reasons that will become clear, we
take Chisholm paradox as stated above in natural language, instead of its SDL
version. We use the same letters to denote the propositions/laws as used in the
deontic representation of the paradox, for a better comparison.
In first law in the paradox, i.e., the law state in item 1 is a nominal in
iALC, and hence it is a Kripke world in our model. The same can be said
about item 2. The state-of-affairs, expressed in iALC, is simply the assertions:
l1 : ⊤ and l2 : ⊤. Note that this assertions only state that there are two laws
l1 and l2 in the legal universe. Since a Kripke model for intuitionistic logic
is a Heyting algebra, and hence it is a lattice too, there must be the meet
of these two worlds. This is represented in the model by law l0, intuitively
stating that it is obligatory to do what law l1 and law l2 state. Item 3 of
the paradox is a conditional that generally states that if some proposition is
truth then some law exists. This is a rather hard expression in judicial terms.
Laws exist by promulgation only, they do not have their existence conditioned
to anything but their own promulgation. This conditional expression can be
raised in a legislative discussion only. But even in this exceptional case, the
raising of paradoxes, as the one under discussion, advices that such use should
be avoided. What item 3 says, instead, is simply that ¬p holds in the world
l3 that is the law cited as the consequent of the conditional. Finally, as the
model is a lattice, there must be a world l4 that represents the law that it is the
conjunctive law related to l0 and l3, in the same way l0 is related to l1 and l2.
Now, in l4, it is ensured that ¬p holds by the intuitionistic interpretation of the
negation. As a result the model depicted in the diagram below is a model for
what is known by Chisholm paradox. Thus, it is not a paradox when expressed
in iALCin a kelsenian way.
19
8 SOLVING CONTRARY-TO-DUTY PARADOXES IN IALC
WVUTPQRSl1 |= ⊤ WVUTPQRSl2 |= ⊤
WVUTPQRSl0 |= ⊤

dd■■■■■■■■■■

::✉✉✉✉✉✉✉✉✉✉ _^]\XYZ[l3 |= ¬p
WVUTPQRSl4 6|= p

dd■■■■■■■■■■

::✉✉✉✉✉✉✉✉✉✉✉
Figure 4: Kripke model for the iALCrepresentation of Chisholm paradox
1. The law l1, originally Op
2. The law l2, originally O(p→ q)
3. From (3), ¬p→ O¬q, we have l3 : ¬p. If we had O¬q → ¬p the translation
would be the same. That is, l3 is O¬q.
4. The law l0 that represents the infinum of l1 and l2.
The diagram in figure 4, shows the Kripke model to Chisholm paradox dis-
cussed above. Remember that if x : A then ∀x′ ≥ x, x′ : A.
Only to estimate the range of our approach for solving semantical (contrary-
to-duty) paradoxes. The free choice permission paradox reported on (Ross,
1941)) is derived on the supposition that there is a logic of norms, as for example
SDL. The dilemma on the existence of such a logic of normas is also known as
Jorgensen dilemma. At the next section we draw the conclusion that iALC is
more likely to such a logic than SDL. In fact in the sequel we detail the free
choice permission paradox in SDL and we can see that the steps based on the
K axiom cannot be derived inside iALC.
Consider the tautology p→ p ∨ q. We have by necessity SDL rule that:
O(p→ p ∨ q)
is derivable in SDL. By the axiom K:
O(p)→ O(p ∨ q)
is also derivable. On the other hand, by contra-positive on the first sentence,
we have
¬(p ∨ q)→ ¬p
, so, and hence
O(¬(p ∨ q))→ O(¬q)
by K necessitation and K again. Thus, by contra-positive again, we obtain
¬O(¬q)→ ¬O(¬(p ∨ q))
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Taking ¬O(¬φ) as permitted φ, rather better P (φ), we draw:
P (p)→ P (p ∨ q)
The free choice permission states that if P (p∨q) holds then P (p)∧P (q). Consider
that we accept the free choice permission, so to say the formula
P (p ∨ q)→ (P (p) ∧ P (q))
As p → (p ∨ q), then by what was discussed above, P (p) → P (p ∨ q), then by
the free choice permission, we draw that
P (p)→ P (p ∧ q)
for any q. In summary, in the presence of the free choice permission axiom,
we can derive that P (p) → P (q) for every q, which should not happen. If we
use iALC together with Kelsen jurisprudence, and hence intuitionistic logic, we
cannot derive all the steps above, for K cannot be used. Anyway, our definition
of permission is rather different from what was used in this paragraph, see
section 9. We can conclude that many paradoxes that are based on the axiom
K are not legal paradoxes in a Kelsenian formalization of legal situations in
iALC anymore.
9 Conclusion
In this article, we shown how intuitionistic logic and Kelsen’s jurisprudence can
be used to express Chisholm paradox faithfully. A key fact in providing a logical
model to this paradox is that laws/norms are not taken as propositions. For
example, in the explanation above on building the model, if we turn back to
deontic expression of laws, we will have that l1 is Op and l2 is O(p→ q), but we
cannot derive that l3 is O(q). l3 is of course the meet (⊓) between l1 and l2, as
a meet it is strongly connection to O(l1) ∧ O(l2) ↔ O(l1 ∧ l2), which is a SDL
valid formula. Thus, l3 is the norm O(l1 ∧ l2), that is an obligation. However,
now remembering what norms l1 and l2 are in this particular case, l3 is the
meeting O(p) ∧ O(p → q) that it is O(p ∧ (p → q)). This conclusion, however,
does not entail that in l3 can be identified with O(q), since our implication is the
intuitionistic implication. This very last aspect of joining Kelsen jurisprudence
and iALC also helps to avoid other deontic paradoxes.
Jorgensen’s Dilemma (Jorgensen, 1937) offers a question, in fact, a dilemma,
whether there is, in fact, any deontic logic. The question follows this path: 1)
Norms/laws deal with evaluative sentences; 2) Evaluative sentences are not the
kind of sentence that can be true or false; 3) Thus, how there is a logic of
evaluative sentences? 4) Logic has as goal to define what can be drawn from
whatever, and; 5) A sentence follows from a set of sentences on a basis of the
relationship between the truth of the sentences in question. Thus, there is no
deontic logic. What we have shown in this article, is that deontic logic is possible
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by considering the logic of norms as a logic on norms, instead. This reading is
just what we do in legal ontologies.
We have to touch some aspects that are very well-known in the deontic ap-
proach. One is the deontic concept of permission. This case is modeled by
observing that in a society regulated by law, permission is nothing more than
an obligation of the State. The State promulgates what is allowed. Concerning
prohibitions, the foundation is analogous. However, some subtle and theoreti-
cal problems may arise if one wants to recover the definition of forbidden (F )
regarding the very well-known duality F (p) ≡ O(¬p). This discussion will be
the subject of another article.
Finally, we would like to comment that professor Farinas del Cerro taught
us that the research on logic and AI, mainly the first should be approached
by solving part-by-part the problem and elegantly putting everything together.
Well, we learned the first part of this technique, by following him by reading
his articles. We think that in the first part, so to say finding a good foundation
on legal ontologies, one that comes from the domain itself, namely Kelsen ju-
risprudence. Concerning the second part, that is to put everything together in
an elegant way, we known that we are far from it. Another thing that we might
have learned from prof. Farinas is that in this case, it is a matter of time to
have the work in a more mature stage. We hope we reach this stage.
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